From 1957 Prosperity to 1966 Collapse: Why Hypocrisy Is Killing Our National Memory

By Akaneweo Kabiru Abdul

1. Folks, we are hypocrites, and that is one reason why Ghana might never reach the heights some of us aspire to see. Our intellectual class often distorts reality to fit narratives, excusing failure while criticizing others for far less. Oliver Barker Vormawor spends time defending Kwame Nkrumah, portraying the February 24, 1966 coup led by General Kotoka as meaningless, Meanwhile the same person called for the removal of Nana Akufo-Addo through a coup because of hardship. He seems blind to the glaring contradiction: the same policies that bankrupted Nkrumah’s Ghana, he celebrates, yet he Wanted the head of Nana Akufo-Addo And besides, Ghana at Nkrumah’s time had a population of just about 6 million people, small by any modern standard–a population size that made the fiscal collapse is more shocking. Nkrumah failed the Ghanaian!
2. When the British left in March 1957, Ghana’s economy was strong and solvent. Foreign reserves were between US $269–500 million, sufficient to finance several years of imports, and external debt was almost zero. Cocoa dominated exports, accounting for over 60 % of earnings, with production around 317,000 tons in 1959–1960 (NDPC, 1977). Inflation hovered at about 1 %, and the government budget was balanced or slightly in surplus. The civil service worked efficiently, infrastructure was functional, and smallholder agriculture thrived alongside private commerce. Ghana was, without exaggeration, one of Africa’s most promising economies at independence.
3. Industrial activity was limited but growing. GDP in 1960 was estimated at US $1,217 million, with growth rates of 3–5 % annually (Country Economy, 1965). Cocoa revenues alone could finance essential government services without borrowing. Yet, in less than a decade, Nkrumah transformed this small, manageable economy into a country on the brink of collapse, building over 50 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which were mismanaged and became loss-making enterprise, without regard for the fiscal consequences.
4. Nkrumah’s state-led industrialisation program, though ambitious, relied heavily on foreign borrowing and subsidies. Major projects included the Tema Steel Works, Tema Oil Refinery, GHACEM, the State Fishing Corporation, Ghana Airways, and the Volta River Authority (VRA) (Justice Ghana, 2012; Kawa, 2026). While these projects created jobs and expanded the industrial footprint, they operated largely below capacity, suffered from mismanagement, and became political tools rather than economic drivers. By the mid-1960s, external debt had soared from virtually zero in 1957 to around US $760 million (Agecon Search, 1966), and foreign reserves were nearly depleted.
5. Government spending ballooned from 9.5 % of GDP in 1957 to 25.8 % by 1965, while budget deficits widened to –6.4 % of GDP. Inflation, once negligible, hit 22 %, and domestic savings fell from 18 % to 8 %, eroding the country’s capital base (Justice Ghana, 2012; The Vaultz News, 2021). Industrial and service SOEs, including Tema Steel Works, Ghana Airways, and state railways, ran at losses and relied entirely on government support. COCOBOD revenues declined in real terms due to falling world cocoa prices and heavy taxation, while state-owned banks and agricultural boards extended credit to unprofitable ventures.
6. By 1966, real GDP growth had turned negative at –4.3 %, currency shortages restricted imports, and industrial productivity faltered. Nkrumah had managed to bankrupt a country with just 6 million people, an economy that had previously been solvent and export-driven. And yet, Oliver Barker Vormawor celebrates this record, framing it as visionary leadership which I don’t begrudge, but had the temerity to call for the removal of Nana Akufo-Addo under far less extreme conditions. The hypocrisy is staggering: he praises the destruction of Nkrumah’s Ghana. This is an insult to our intelligence.
7. The February 24, 1966 coup, led by General Kotoka and colleagues, was a direct response to this economic collapse. Military and police officers cited fiscal mismanagement, acute shortages, and rising discontent as justification. Nkrumah’s ambition, untempered by fiscal discipline, turned Ghana from one of Africa’s most promising economies to a learning curve about overexpansion, debt accumulation, and unprofitable state enterprises.
8. In finality, Ghana at independence in 1957(British) was strong: low debt, robust reserves, stable prices, and a productive export base. Less than a decade later, under Nkrumah’s policies, it faced depleted reserves, rising debt, high inflation, and loss-making state institutions. The economic deterioration was real, measurable, and devastating, a fact conveniently ignored by defenders like Oliver Barker Vormawor, who glorify fiscal mismanagement of Nkrumah’s day while condemning others for far less situation. We ought to stop being hypocrites.
9. The funny part is that the antics Oliver engaged in during Nana Addo’s era such as snatching a police car key and making some reckless comments went largely unpunished. If this had happened during Nkrumah’s time, he would have been shot to death. That is a fact.